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Abstract
It is an open problem whether a classical client can delegate quantum computing to an efficient
remote quantum server in such a way that the correctness of quantum computing is somehow
guaranteed. Several protocols for verifiable delegated quantum computing have been proposed,
but the client is not completely free from any quantum technology: the client has to generate or
measure single-qubit states. In this paper, we show that the client can be completely classical if
the server is rational (i.e., economically motivated), following the “rational proofs” framework of
Azar and Micali. More precisely, we consider the following protocol. The server first sends the
client a message allegedly equal to the solution of the problem that the client wants to solve. The
client then gives the server a monetary reward whose amount is calculated in classical probabilistic
polynomial-time by using the server’s message as an input. The reward function is constructed in
such a way that the expectation value of the reward (the expectation over the client’s probabilistic
computing) is maximum when the server’s message is the correct solution to the problem. The
rational server who wants to maximize his/her profit therefore has to send the correct solution to
the client.
∗ tomoyuki.morimae@yukawa.kyoto-u.ac.jp
† hnishimura@is.nagoya-u.ac.jp
1
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important open problems in quantum physics and quantum computing
is the possibility of classically verifying quantum computing [1–3]. As is shown in Fig. 1,
the client, a classical computer, is connected to a remote quantum server via a classical
channel. The server does quantum computing for the client, and sends the result to the
client. The client, who does not trust the server, needs some guarantee that the result is
correct. How can the correctness of server’s quantum computing be guaranteed? There
is an ironical dilemma here: quantum computing is useful because it cannot be classically
efficiently simulated, but exactly because of the fact, it is impossible for the client to verify
the correctness of server’s quantum computing via the direct classical simulation.
Quantum server
Classical
 computer
(Client)
Classical
channel
FIG. 1. The classical verification of quantum computing.
So far, five different types of approaches have been taken to the open problem. First, if
the client is allowed to be “slightly quantum”, verifiable delegated quantum computing is
possible. For example, verification protocols of Refs. [4, 5] and verifiable blind quantum com-
puting protocols [3, 6–16] assume some minimum quantum technologies for the client, such
as small quantum memories, single-qubit state generations, or single-qubit measurements.
Second, if multiple entangling quantum servers who are not communicating with each
other are allowed, a completely classical client can verify the correctness of servers’ quantum
computing [17–19].
Third, several specific problems solvable with quantum computing have been shown to
be classically verifiable. For example, Simon’s problem [20] and factoring [21] are trivially
classically verifiable. Furthermore, the recursive Fourier sampling [22] has a poly-round-
message-exchange verification protocol between a single quantum server and a completely
classical client [23]. Certain problems regarding the output probability distributions of
quantum circuits in the second level of the Fourier hierarchy [24] have single-message verifi-
cation protocols [25, 26]. Calculating the order of solvable groups has two or three-message
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verification protocols [27].
Fourth, it is known that quantum computing is verifiable by using a technique so called
the sum check protocol. However, if we use the sum check protocol, the server needs much
stronger computational power than usual quantum computing. (More precisely, the servers
needs to be #P [28], which is believed to be much stronger than NP.) In Ref. [29], authors
constructed a “quantum version” of the sum check protocol so that the computational power
of the server becomes weaker (but still stronger than usual quantum computing).
Finally, a recent innovative work has shown that a classical verification of quantum com-
puting is indeed possible with the assumption that the learning with errors problem is hard
for quantum computing [30].
In this paper, we take a new approach different from these previous works. We consider a
delegated quantum computing with a rational server. As is shown in Fig. 2, the server first
sends the client a message b allegedly equal to the solution of the problem that the client
wants to solve. The client then does a classical probabilistic polynomial-time computing to
calculate a reward $(b), and pays $(b) to the server. The reward function $ is constructed
in such a way that the expectation value of $ (over the client’s probabilistic computing)
is maximum when b is the correct solution. Therefore, the rational server who wants to
maximize his/her profit has to choose b as the correct solution.
Quantum server
Classical
probabilistic
computer
(Client)
solution b
reward $(b)
FIG. 2. The quantum rational proof system.
We propose two protocols. The first protocol is for decision problems solvable with
polynomial-time quantum computing (i.e., BQP). (Actually, the same construction works
also for other classes in PP.) The second protocol is for estimating output probability dis-
tributions of quantum circuits. Finally, some discussions are given.
The idea of the rational server was first introduced by Azar and Micali in the context
of (classical) interactive proof systems [31], which is called “rational proof systems”. (In
Sec. IVA, we provide a brief summary of their results. Although understanding their results
is not necessary to understand our results, we provide them because they are insightful, and
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therefore should be useful for readers.) Among several results, Azar and Micali constructed
rational proof systems for #P and PP. We bring the idea of the rational proof systems
to the verification of quantum computing. To our knowledge, it is the first time that the
concept of the rational proof systems is applied to quantum information. We believe that
the rational proof systems will also be useful in many other areas of quantum information
than the verification of quantum computing.
II. RESULTS
A. First protocol
In this subsection, we propose our first protocol for BQP. Let us assume that the client
wants to solve a decision problem L in BQP. The client asks the server to solve the problem,
and the server sends a single bit b ∈ {0, 1} to the client. If the server is honest, the server
sends the client b = 1 when the answer is yes (x ∈ L), and b = 0 when the answer is no
(x /∈ L).
Since BQP is in PP, there exists a classical probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A
that outputs a ∈ {0, 1} such that
• If x ∈ L then Pr[a = 1] > 1
2
.
• If x /∈ L then Pr[a = 1] < 1
2
.
The client runs A. If a = b, the client gives the server the reward $ = 1. If a 6= b, $ = 0.
The expectation value 〈$〉b of server’s reward when the server sends b ∈ {0, 1} to the client
is
〈$〉b = 1× Pr[a = b] + 0× Pr[a 6= b]
= Pr[a = b].
Therefore, if x ∈ L,
〈$〉b=1 = Pr[a = 1] > 1
2
,
〈$〉b=0 = Pr[a = 0] < 1
2
.
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If x /∈ L,
〈$〉b=0 = Pr[a = 0] > 1
2
,
〈$〉b=1 = Pr[a = 1] < 1
2
.
This means that the rational sever wants to send the correct solution to the client.
Although we use the class PP, the important point here is that the server’s computational
ability is enough to be BQP in our protocol. It is clear that the same proof holds for other
classes in PP, such as AWPP, QCMA, QMA, SBQP, and C=P, etc.
B. Second protocol
Let us explain our second protocol, which is for estimating output probability distribu-
tions of quantum computing. Consider an n-qubit quantum circuit V . Without loss of
generality, we can assume that V consists of only classical gates (such as X , CNOT, Toffoli,
etc.) and Hadamard gates [32, 33]. (Generalizations to other gate sets, such as Clifford plus
T , are given in Sec. IVB.) Let
pz ≡ 〈0n|V †(|z〉〈z| ⊗ I⊗n−k)V |0n〉
be the probability of obtaining z ∈ {0, 1}k when the first k qubits of V |0n〉 is measured
in the computational basis. We assume that k = O(log(n)). The client wants to know a
probability distribution p˜ ≡ {p˜z}z∈{0,1}k , which is close to p ≡ {pz}z∈{0,1}k in the sense that
|pz−p˜z| ≤ 1poly(n) for all z ∈ {0, 1}k. Such an estimation p˜ can be obtained in quantum poly(n)
time (see Sec IVC), but the client who is completely classical cannot do it by him/herself.
The client therefore delegates the task to the server. We here provide a protocol where the
client can receive such an estimation from the rational server.
From V , we construct the (n+ 1)-qubit quantum circuit
Wz ≡ (I ⊗ V †)
[(
I ⊗ |z〉〈z| +X ⊗ (I⊗k − |z〉〈z|)
)
⊗ I⊗n−k
]
(I ⊗ V )
for each z ∈ {0, 1}k. It is easy to see
〈0n+1|Wz|0n+1〉 = pz. (1)
We can construct a classical probabilistic computing Mz that “simulates” Wz such that
〈0n+1|Wz|0n+1〉 = 2h(Dz(1)−Dz(2)), (2)
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where h is the number of Hadamard gates in V , and Dz(w) is the probability that Mz
outputs w ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In fact, Let t be the number of elementary gates in Wz. In other
words, Wz = ut · · ·u1, where ui (i = 1, 2, ..., t) is a classical gate or the Hadamard gate. We
consider the following t-step classical probabilistic computing Mz:
1. The state of the register is represented by the pair (z, c) of an (n + 1)-bit string
z ≡ (z1, ..., zn+1) ∈ {0, 1}n+1 and a single bit c ∈ {0, 1}. The initial state of the
register is (z = 0n+1, c = 0).
2. For i = 1, 2, ..., t, do the following:
2-a. If ui is a classical gate, update the register as (z, c)→ (ui(z), c).
2-b. If ui is the Hadamard gate acting on jth qubit, flip a fair coin. If heads, update
the register as
(z, c)→ (z1, ..., zj−1, 0, zj+1, ..., zn+1, c).
If tails, update the register as
(z, c)→ (z1, ..., zj−1, 1, zj+1, ..., zn+1, c⊕ zj).
3. If the state of the register is (0n+1, 0), output 1. If the state of the register is (0n+1, 1),
output 2. Otherwise, output 3.
An example of the computational tree for n = 2, t = 4, and
u1 = X ⊗ I ⊗ I,
u2 = H ⊗ I ⊗ I,
u3 = (|0〉〈0| ⊗ I + |1〉〈1| ⊗X)⊗ I,
u4 = I ⊗H ⊗ I,
is given in Fig. 3.
Now it is easy to check Eq. (2). (In the example of Fig. 3, Dz(1) =
1
4
, Dz(2) = 0, and
Dz(3) =
3
4
.) Therefore, from Eqs. (1) and (2), we obtain
pz = 2
h(Dz(1)−Dz(2)). (3)
Our protocol runs as follows.
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(z=000,c=0)
(z=100,c=0)
1
u
(z=000,c=0) (z=100,c=1)
2
u
(z=000,c=0)
3
u
(z=110,c=1)
3
u
(z=000,c=0) (z=010,c=0)
4
u
(z=100,c=1) (z=110,c=0)
4
u
FIG. 3. An example of the computational tree.
1. The server sends a classical description of a probability distribution p′ ≡ {p′z}z∈{0,1}k
to the client. If the server is honest, |p′z − pz| ≤ 1poly(n) for all z.
2. The client chooses z ∈ {0, 1}k uniformly at random.
3. The client runs Mz and obtains the output w ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
4. The client pays the reward to the server whose amount $ is determined according to
the following rule:
– If w = 1, then $ = S(z, p′) + 2.
– If w = 2, then $ = −S(z, p′) + 2.
– Otherwise, $ = 2.
Here,
S(z, p′) ≡ 2p′z −
∑
α∈{0,1}k
(p′α)
2 − 1
is called Brier’s scoring rule [34].
The expectation value 〈$〉 of the prover’s reward is
〈$〉 = 1
2k+h
∑
z∈{0,1}k
pzS(z, p
′) + 2,
where we have used Eq. (3).
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Note that
∑
z∈{0,1}k
pzS(z, p)−
∑
z∈{0,1}k
pzS(z, p
′) =
∑
z∈{0,1}k
(pz − p′z)2,
which means that 〈$〉 is larger if p′ is closer to p. As is explained in Sec. IVC, the quantum
polynomial-time prover can send p′ such that |p′z − pz| ≤ 1poly(n) for all z. If the server sends
another p′ such that |p′z − pz| = const. for a certain z, on the other hand, his/her expected
profit becomes smaller. Therefore the rational prover will not do that.
III. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have constructed delegated quantum computing protocols with a clas-
sical client and a rational quantum server. Let us here mention three advantages of our
protocols.
First, our protocols are zero-knowledge, which means that no information other than the
solution of the problem itself is leaked from the server to the client.
Second, our protocols do not require any extra computational overhead for the server. For
example, in the verification protocols of Refs. [7, 8], some extra trap qubits are needed, and
in the verification protocols of Refs. [4–6], the server has to generate the Feynman-Kitaev
history state
1√
T + 1
T∑
t=0
(vt · · · v1|0n〉)⊗ |t〉,
where V = vT · · · v1, which is more complicated than the mere output state, V |0n〉, of the
quantum computation. On the other hand, in our protocols, what the server has to do is
only the original quantum computing that the client would do if the client had his/her own
quantum computer.
Finally, our protocols neither generate any extra communication overhead between the
server and the client. In the verification protocols of Refs. [7, 8], polynomially many bits
have to be exchanged between the server and the client in order to verify that the server
did the correct measurements on trap qubits. In the verification protocols of Refs. [4–6], the
server has to send the client a Feynman-Kitaev history state, which consists of polynomially
many qubits. On the other hand, in our protocols, what the server has to send to the client
is only the solution of the problem that the client wants to solve.
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In our protocols, reward gaps are exponentially small. It is an open problem whether
the constant (or at least polynomial-inverse) reward gap is possible. Unfortunately, we can
show that as long as we consider a single-round protocol with the server sending a single
bit, it is not possible unless BQP = BPP. It is shown by using Theorem 16 of Ref. [35], but
for readers’ convenience, we give a proof here in our notation. The expectation value of the
server’s reward when the server sends b ∈ {0, 1} to the client is
〈$〉b =
∑
w
pw$(b, w),
where the classical probabilistic polynomial-time computing outputs w with probability pw.
Since |$(w, b)| ≤ const. for any w and b, the client can estimate the value of 〈$〉b within
a 1
poly
precision in classical probabilistic polynomial time by using the standard Chernoff-
Hoeffding bound argument. In fact, let w1, w2, ..., wT be the random numbers sampled from
the probability distribution {pw}w. The quantity
η ≡ 1
T
T∑
i=1
$(wi, b)
is an ǫ precision estimator of 〈$〉b due to the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound:
Pr
[
|η − 〈$〉b| ≥ ǫ] ≤ 2 exp
[
− Tǫ
2
2M2
]
,
where M ≡ maxw,b |$(w, b)|. If M ≤ poly, T = poly is enough to get the ǫ = 1poly precision.
If |〈$〉b=1 − 〈$〉b=0| ≥ 1poly , the client can learn which b gives larger 〈$〉b by itself in classical
probabilistic polynomial time, which means BQP = BPP.
One might notice that the above argument does not work if the server sends the client
not a single bit b ∈ {0, 1} but a polynomial-length bit string b ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|). In this case,
it is no longer possible to calculate 〈$〉b for all exponentially many b in classical polynomial
time. However, such a generalization does not help, because, as is shown in Sec. IVD, the
power of such a rational proof system is in the third level of the polynomial-time hierarchy.
We also remark effects of errors. For the first protocol, errors in the server do not cause
any problem as long as the bit b is correct. For the second protocol, again, errors do not
cause any problem as long as the final estimated probabilities are 1/poly-close to the true
values.
To conclude this paper, let us also mention security of our protocols. In our first protocol,
if the client’s result a is leaked to the server before the server sends b to the client, the server
9
can cheat. Therefore, the client’s result a should be hidden from the server. On the other
hand, a malicious client can cheat the server. For example, if the server sends b = 1 to
the client, the malicious client will claim that he/she has generated a = 0 thus avoiding
the payment. One way of preventing it would be that the client first commits a to the
server by using the bit commitment protocol. In this case, however, the security becomes a
computational one.
IV. APPENDIX
A. Brief summary of Ref. [31]
Here we briefly summarize some of results in Ref. [31]. To understand the essence, let us
consider the following protocol:
1. The client samples w from a probability distribution D.
2. The server sends the client the description of a probability distribution D′.
3. The client gives the server the reward S(D′, w).
Here,
S(D′, w) ≡ 2D′(w)−
∑
α
(D′(α))2 − 1
is called Brier’s scoring rule [34]. In the above protocol, server’s expected profit is
∑
wD(w)S(D
′, w). By the straightforward calculation,
∑
w
D(w)S(D,w)−
∑
w
D(w)S(D′, w) =
∑
w
(D(w)−D′(w))2.
Therefore, server’s expected profit is maximum when D′ = D. In other words, if the server
wants to maximize the expected profit, he/she has to send D′ = D. The point is that this
protocol enables the client, who can sample from D but does not know the description of
D, to learn the description of D from the rational server.
In Ref. [31], this idea was used to construct a single-message rational protocol for #P
problems. Let
φ : {0, 1}n ∋ x 7→ φ(x) ∈ {0, 1}
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be a Boolean function that can be calculated in classical polynomial time. The client first
samples an n-bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly at random. He/She then outputs φ(x). The
probability that the client outputs 0 is #φ
2n
, where #φ is the number of x ∈ {0, 1}n such that
φ(x) = 0. In other words, the client can sample from the probability distribution
D : {0, 1} ∋ w 7→ D(w) ∈ [0, 1]
such that D(0) = #φ
2n
and D(1) = 1 − #φ
2n
. The ability of sampling from D is not enough
for the BPP client to learn #φ, since the estimation of D(0) with an exponential precision
is required. However, if the client uses the above protocol, the client can learn #φ, since
the rational server sends the client the description of D′ such that D′(0) = #φ
2n
and D′(1) =
1− #φ
2n
.
B. Another gate set
Let us assume that a circuit V consists of only Clifford and T ≡ Z 14 gates. In other
words, V = ut · · ·u1, where ui (i = 1, 2, ..., t) is H , CZ, S =
√
Z, or T . Let us consider the
following t-step non-deterministic computing:
1. The state of the register is represented by (p, c, k), where p represents the tensor
product of n Pauli operators, c ∈ {+1,−1} represents the sign, and k is an integer
that counts the number of non-deterministic transitions experienced. The initial state
of the register is (p = Z ⊗ I⊗n−1, c = +1, k = 0).
2. For i = 1, 2, ..., t, do the following:
2-a. If ui is a Clifford gate g, update the register as (p, c, k)→ (g†pg, c′, k).
2-b. If ui is T gate acting on jth qubit, and if jth Pauli operator of p is Z, do nothing
on the register.
2-c. If ui is T gate acting on jth qubit, and if jth Pauli operator of p is X , do the
following non-deterministic transition:
(p, c, k)→


(p1 ⊗ ...⊗ pj−1 ⊗X ⊗ pj+1 ⊗ ...⊗ pn, c, k + 1)
(p1 ⊗ ...⊗ pj−1 ⊗ Y ⊗ pj+1 ⊗ ...⊗ pn, c, k + 1).
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2-d. If ui is T gate acting on jth qubit, and if jth Pauli operator of p is Y , do the
following non-deterministic transition:
(p, c, k)→


(p1 ⊗ ...⊗ pj−1 ⊗X ⊗ pj+1 ⊗ ...⊗ pn,−c, k + 1)
(p1 ⊗ ...⊗ pj−1 ⊗ Y ⊗ pj+1 ⊗ ...⊗ pn, c, k + 1).
An example for n = 3, t = 6, and
u1 = H ⊗ I ⊗ I,
u2 = T ⊗ I ⊗ I,
u3 = CZ ⊗ I,
u4 = H ⊗ I ⊗ I,
u5 = T ⊗ I ⊗ I,
u6 = H ⊗ I ⊗ I,
is given in Fig. 4.
(ZII,+1,0)
(XII,+1,0)
u1
(XII,+1,1) (YII,+1,1)
u2
u4
(ZZI,+1,1)
u4
(YZI,-1,1)
u5
(ZZI,+1,1)
(XZI,+1,2) (YZI,-1,2)
u5
u3
(XZI,+1,1)
u3
(YZI,+1,1)
u6
(XZI,+1,1)
u6
(YZI,+1,2)
u6
(ZZI,+1,2)
FIG. 4. An example of the non-deterministic computation. For simplicity, the symbol ⊗ is omitted,
i.e., Z ⊗ I ⊗ I is written as ZII, for example.
It is easy to check that
〈0n|V †(Z ⊗ I⊗n−1)V |0n〉 =
∑
i:path
ci√
2ki
fi,
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where the summation is taken over all paths, (pi, ci, ki) is the final state of the register
corresponding to the path i, and
fi ≡


1 if pi consists of only Z and I,
0 otherwise.
Hence
pacc =
1
2
+
1
2
〈0n|V †(Z ⊗ I⊗n−1)V |0n〉
=
1
2
+
1
2
∑
i:path
ci√
2ki
fi.
C. Estimation
We generate V |0n〉 and measure the first k qubits in the computational basis. Output
X = 1 if the result is z. Otherwise, output X = 0. We repeat it for T times to correct
X1, ..., XT ∈ {0, 1}. If we define
ηz ≡ 1
T
T∑
i=1
Xi,
it satisfies
Pr[|ηz − pz| ≥ ǫ] ≤ 2e−2Tǫ2
due to the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound. If we take ǫ = 1
2kn
, T = poly(n) is enough to guarantee
that |ηz − pz| ≤ 12kn except for an exponentially small probability. We do this procedure
for all z ∈ {0, 1}k to obtain {ηz}z∈{0,1}k . Except for an exponentially small probability,
|ηz − pz| ≤ 12kn for all z. Let us define
p˜z ≡ ηz∑
z∈{0,1}k ηz
for each z. Then,
p˜z ≤ pz + ǫ
1− 2kǫ ≤ pz + 5× 2
kǫ,
and
p˜z ≥ pz − ǫ
1 + 2kǫ
≥ pz − 5× 2kǫ.
Therefore
|p˜z − pz| ≤ 1
poly(n)
for all z except for an exponentially small probability.
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D. Longer message
Let L be a language and x be its instance. Assume that L has the following rational
proof system:
1. The server sends b ∈ {0, 1}m to the client, where m = poly(|x|).
2. The client samples a polynomial-length bit string w from a probability distribution D,
and sends the reward $(b, w) to the server.
3. The client calculates a predicate π(x, b) ∈ {0, 1} and accepts/rejects if π(x, b) = 1/0,
where π is a polynomial-time computable Boolean function.
The expectation value of the server’s reward when he/she sends b to the client is
〈$〉b =
∑
w
D(w)$(b, w).
We require that the rational proof system satisfies the following:
• When x ∈ L then there exists b∗ ∈ {0, 1}m such that π(x, b∗) = 1, and 〈$〉b∗−〈$〉b ≥ 1h
for all b that satisfies π(x, b) = 0, where h = poly(|x|).
• When x /∈ L then there exists b∗ ∈ {0, 1}m such that π(x, b∗) = 0, and 〈$〉b∗−〈$〉b ≥ 1h
for all b that satisfies π(x, b) = 1.
We can show that if maxb,w |$(b, w)| ≤ poly(|x|), then L is in NPMA[1], which is in NPMA ⊆
ΣP3 [28]. It means that the above rational proof system will not contain BQP, because BQP
is not believed to be in the third level of the polynomial-time hierarchy.
In fact, let us consider the following probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm M on input
(x, b, a) ∈ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}m × {0, 1}m:
1. Calculate π(x, b), π(x, a) ∈ {0, 1}.
2. By using the Chernoff bound, calculate 1
h2
−precision estimates, ηb and ηa, of 〈$〉b
and 〈$〉a, respectively. Except for an exponentially small failure probability e−poly(|x|),
|ηb − 〈$〉b| ≤ 1h2 and |ηa − 〈$〉a| ≤ 1h2 .
3. If π(x, b) = π(x, a) = 1, accept. If π(x, b) = 1, π(x, a) = 0, and ηb − ηa ≥ 1h − 2h2 ,
accept. Otherwise, reject.
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Then L satisfies the following:
• If x ∈ L then there exists b such that for all a, M(x, b, a) accepts with probability at
least 1− 2−r, where r = poly(|x|).
• If x /∈ L then for all b there exists a such that M(x, b, a) accepts with probability at
most 2−r.
Therefore, L is in NPMA[1].
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